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I. INTRODUCTION 
 August 10, 1993 started out normally for Bill Richards.
1
 He walked around the 
neighborhood hand-in-hand with his wife, Pamela.
2
 He then went to work, where 
it was business as usual.
3
 After driving home, eager to see his wife, he arrived 
 
1. William Richards, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-
stories/william-richards/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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home and found his property completely unlit.
4
 Richards and Pamela were in the 
process of building a new home, so they lived in a generator-powered motor 
home.
5
 When Richards went inside to ask Pamela why the generator was not 
running, he found his wife dead on the floor with her head exposed after 
someone beat her with two rocks.
6
  
Hours after Richards called the police, police finally conducted an 
investigation of the crime scene.
7
 At that point, there was no evidence that 
anyone besides Richards had ever been on the property.
8
 They charged Richards 
with Pamela’s murder and a jury found him guilty after three trials.
9
 The 
prosecution’s evidentiary silver bullet was a bite mark found on Pamela’s body 
that supposedly matched Richards’ teeth.
10
 To support this assertion, the 
prosecution utilized an expert to explain the match to the jury.
11
 
California briefly exonerated Richards in 2002, until the Court of Appeals 
overruled the decision.
12
 In 2007, Richards filed a petition for habeas corpus.
13
 
His petition argued that newly discovered evidence showed that the expert’s 
incriminating testimony was not based on substantial scientific evidence.
14
 
Furthermore, the expert who testified at the trial reviewed other evidence and 
stated that he was no longer sure that Richards’ teeth matched the bite marks.
15
 
Other dental experts agreed the testimony was incorrect.
16
  
Armed with this evidence, the California Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case to determine whether the lower court’s finding that this evidence “pointed 
unerringly to innocence,” the standard required for newly discovered evidence, 
was correct.
17
 According to the court, the evidence that the alleged bite mark 
linking Richards to the murder may not have been a bite mark at all and did not 
meet the “point unerringly to innocence” standard.
18
 Due to what the court 
considered to be other persuasive evidence from trial, although they agreed this 
 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 953 (2012) (stating that the length of time was due to the remote 
location of the property). 
8. William Richards, supra note 1. 
9. Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 955.  
10.  Id. at 955. 
11.  See id. (presenting Dr. Sperber as an expert testifying based only on his own professional dentistry 
experience with almost no foundational scientific background to substantiate his testimony).  
12.  William Richards, supra note 1. 
13.  Richards, 55 Cal. 4th at 956.  
14.  Id. 
15.  See id. (admitting that the in his testimony that the bite marks were attributable to only one or two 
percent of the population was based on personal experience and no science supported his assertion).  
16.  Id. at 956–57.  
17.  Id. at 959.  
18.  Id. at 968. 
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new evidence undermined the expert’s credibility, it was insufficient to overturn 
Richards’ conviction.
19
  
In cases like Richards’, where new evidence does not definitively exculpate 
the prisoner, it is much harder to successfully file a habeas petition.
20
 SB 694 
attempted to change the evidentiary standard of habeas petition claims letting 
prisoners introduce new evidence that has a “reasonable probability” of changing 
the outcome if granted a new trial, but the bill was held in the Assembly 
Appropriations Committee.
21
  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section will look at the common law origins of habeas corpus and how 
the United States adopted the writ, California’s own version of habeas, and the 
remedies available to exonerate prisoners.
22
 This section will also briefly 
introduce how federal habeas corpus has changed over the years and its 
interaction with state habeas claims.
23
 
A. Historical Origins of the Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus 
A writ of habeas corpus brings a convicted person before a court to “ensure 
that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”
24
 Habeas corpus 
originated from what the medieval period referred to as habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, which required the person imprisoning the individual who 
requested the writ to bring the prisoner to court and explain the reason for the 
imprisonment.
25
 The court could order the prisoner’s release if it found that the 
state detained the prisoner without a valid reason.
26
 
Historically, the writ of habeas corpus dealt with jurisdictional issues more 
than concerns with prisoner’s rights violations.
27
 When Parliament realized the 
monarchy may have been unjustifiably detaining prisoners it believed were 
 
19.  See id. (concluding that denial was appropriate based on the nature of Richards’ relationship with his 
wife at the time, the remote location of the property, and Richards’ knowledge of the crime scene).  
20. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 2 (Aug. 24, 
2015) (discussing California’s high standard for habeas claims based upon new evidence). 
21. SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not 
enacted). 
22. Infra Part II.A–D.  
23. Infra Part II.B.  
24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014). 
25. James Landman, You Should Have the Body: Understanding Habeas Corpus, SOCIAL EDUCATION 99 
(2008). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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plotting against it, the focus of the writ of habeas corpus shifted to prisoners’ 
rights.
28
 
After initial attempts to force the monarchy to enforce writs of habeas 
corpus, Parliament enacted the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679.
29
 The Act created 
rules on how much time the monarchy had to “return on a writ” and imposed 
very hefty fines if the monarchy did not complete a timely return.
30
 
B. Habeas Corpus Introduced into American Law 
Article I, section 9 of the Constitution grants specific protection of the writ of 
habeas corpus—the only English common law right included in the original 
drafting of the Constitution in 1787.
31
 A few years later, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
empowered the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus.
32
 The Civil War 
tested the limits of habeas and the Suspension Clause in the Constitution by 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
33
 When citizens challenged President 
Lincoln’s authority to do so, the case made it all the way to the Supreme Court.
34
 
When Chief Justice Taney decided the President did not have authority, Congress 
gave him the authority to suspend the writ during wartime for public safety in 
1863.
35
 After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 
extending the authority of the federal government to issue writs “where any 
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution.”
36
 
This allowed the federal government to hear petitions from state prisoners.
37
 
Today, petitioning for habeas corpus is protected by the federal 
Constitution,
38
 as well as the California Constitution.
39
 A petitioner may file 
habeas claims in both state and federal court; however, in order to file a habeas 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 99–100. First, the Parliament passed the Petition of Right in 1628, which stated that the 
monarchy was imprisoning individuals without any justified reason. Id. Following this petition, the Parliament 
passed an act in 1641, abolishing a special prisoner quarters called the “Star Board” which the monarchy kept a 
secret and hid away prisoners who it specifically felt were targeting the monarchy. Id. at 100. 
30. Id. 
31. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 cl. 2.; Landman, supra note 25, at 102. 
32. Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The act only granted the writ to individuals who were in custody 
under the federal government. Landman, supra note 25, at 100.  
33. Landman, supra note 25, at 100–01. The Suspension Clause is found in Article I of the Constitution, 
which defines congressional powers just as the English use of the writ historically limited the executive power 
of the monarchy. Id. After the Civil War began, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in order 
to be able to apprehend individuals believed to be acting against the federal government. Id. at 102. 
34. Ex parte Merryman, 9 Am. Law Reg. 524 (1861). 
35. Id.; cf. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 cl. 2. (adopting similar principles to the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 
of 1863); Landman, supra note 25, at 101.  
36. Landman, supra note 25, at 102. 
37. Id. 
38. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 cl. 2. 
39.  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10. 
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claim in federal court, the claim must be related to the U.S. Constitution or 
federal law.
40
 Habeas corpus is most commonly used during post-conviction 
review of a possible violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights that may have 
resulted in an unfair trial, thereby making the prisoner’s imprisonment illegal.
41
 
Habeas corpus is not a substitute for a conviction appeal, but only filed once 
a prisoner has exhausted all appeals.
42
 To file a state habeas petition, the 
petitioner’s direct appeal must either be heard in state court concurrently at the 
time of filing the petition or after the state Supreme Court denies the appeal.
43
 
Additionally, circumstances that cannot be heard on appeal, such as false or 
newly discovered evidence, are grounds for filing a habeas petition.
44
 In the event 
the petitioner’s appeals to all levels of the state court fail and his or her state 
habeas claim is denied, the petitioner may raise a federal habeas claim.
45
 
States differ on the standard of proof required in a habeas petition based 
solely on new evidence.
46
 Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
currently utilize a statutorily created post-conviction remedy intending to replace 
the writ of habeas corpus that uses the “reasonable possibility of a different 
outcome” standard.
47
 California and eleven other states use the writ of habeas 
corpus as the primary judicial remedy for post-conviction relief.
48
 Applying a 
“reasonable possibility” standard to claims based on new evidence matches the 
standard required for other post-conviction relief claims, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
49
 
Petitioners filing for federal habeas face major obstacles due to limited 
appellate records.
50
 State courts increasingly deny petitions for summary 
 
40. Theresa Hsu Schriever, In Our Own Backyard: Why California Should Care About Habeas Corpus, 
45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 763, 767 (2014). 
41. 30 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §§ 2, 6–7 (2014). 
42. CAL. PENAL CODE §1473 (West 2013); see also In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 645–46 (1995) 
(finding that the superior court did not interfere with the appellate jurisdiction by entertaining claims of juror 
misconduct that did not appear in the record). 
43. Marks v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 176, 188 (2002) (“[The argument that habeas corpus derives 
from the record] conflicts with the rule that collateral review by habeas corpus is not a reiteration of or 
substitute for an appeal.”). 
44. PENAL § 1473; SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, 
but not enacted). 
45. Schriever, supra note 40, at 771–72; Letter from Prison Law Office on Collateral Attacks on Criminal 
Conviction through State and Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions (Aug. 2009) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). Federal habeas claims require a constitutional or federal statutory basis. Schriever, supra 
note 40, at 779. 
46. STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 256–57 (Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. ed., 
11th ed. 2011) [hereinafter STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES]. 
47. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 4 (Apr. 21, 2014); 
STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 46, at 4–5. 
48. STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 46, at 4–5. 
49. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 4. 
50. See Schriever, supra note 40, at 771 (explaining that courts are not required to provide opinions for 
petitions denied summarily). 
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judgment and are not required to provide an explanation.
51
 These summary 
judgment denials severely limit the state appellate record, making it difficult for 
the petitioner to provide enough evidence of entitlement to relief as required for a 
federal habeas claim upon review.
52
 As a result, unless the petitioner can prove a 
separate constitutional violation, which would give the claim federal standing, 
the current “point unerringly to innocence” standard for new or false evidence 
bars many petitioners from relief under federal habeas corpus.
53
 
Filing federal habeas claims became more difficult in 1996 when Congress 
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
54
 The 
AEDPA contains a provision that limits the power of a federal judge to grant 
relief under a habeas corpus provision if the state court previously denied it.
55
 The 
federal court may review the claim if one of two exceptions applies: either the 
state court proceeding was contrary to federal law or the state court’s application 
of federal law was unreasonably wrong.
56
 
C. The Evolution of the Habeas Corpus Standard in California 
California added the common law writ of habeas corpus as a statutory post-
conviction remedy in 1872.
57
 In 1975, California amended the Penal Code to 
distinguish between a claim based on “false evidence” and “newly discovered 
evidence,” suggesting, but not expressly stating, that only claims of false 
evidence were permissible to file a habeas claim.
58
 Case law later clarified that 
newly discovered evidence was considered permissible grounds for a habeas 
corpus petition.
59
 
When a prisoner files a habeas corpus petition on the grounds of false 
evidence, proof must show that the evidence was “material or probative on the 
issue of the [prisoner’s] guilt.”
60
 Courts consider evidence to be material or 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id.at 793 
53. Id. at 779. 
54. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 (2015); Letter from Prison Law 
Office, supra note 45. 
55. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 2254. 
56. Id.  
57. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473–1508 (West 2013). 
58. Id. § 1473(a). Claims of false evidence are where the prisoner’s conviction depended on evidence 
later proven to be incorrect or obtained under false pretense, while newly discovered evidence claims are where 
years after the conviction, new evidence is discovered that disproves the prisoner’s conviction. Id. 
59. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 6 (July 13, 2015); 
see In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 760, (1993) (“A refusal to consider a claim of factual innocence based on newly 
discovered evidence would be constitutionally suspect in a capital case.”). 
60. In re Bell, 42 Cal. 4th 630, 637 (2007). 
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probative if there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different had the evidence been introduced.
61
 
For the court to consider a prisoner’s habeas claim on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence, the evidence must be conclusive and point unerringly to 
innocence, thereby effectively “undermining the entire structure” of the 
prosecution’s case.
62
 Statutory law defines new evidence as “evidence that [the 
petitioner] could not have discovered with reasonable diligence prior to 
judgment.”
63
  
The “point unerringly to innocence” standard is very high and the California 
Supreme Court stated in In re Lawley that this standard exceeds the standard used 
in other habeas claims, which use the civil law “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard.
64
 When federal courts review state petitions, the court presumes the 
judgment is final because the state court is expected to make correct factual 
determinations.
65
 So in order to prevail, the petitioner must successfully 
overcome that presumption by proving the newly discovered evidence certainly 
demonstrates his or her innocence.
66
 
 In cases where the evidence “merely” undermined the prosecution’s case or 
created a “more difficult” decision for the jury in determining guilt, courts held 
the standard was not met.
67
 California courts have applied the standard for new 
evidence broadly.
68
 
In 2013, Senator Leno authored two bills that affected the rights of prisoners 
and exonerated individuals, both of which were chaptered.
69
 Chapter 623 allows 
prisoners to petition for a writ of habeas corpus when scientific or technological 
 
61. Sosan Madanat, SB 1058: Wrongful Convictions Involving Improper Forensic Science, UNDER THE 
DOME (Sept. 14, 2015), http://blogs.mcgeorge.edu/lawandpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SB-1058-False-
Evidence.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
62. In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723 (1947) (“newly discovered evidence does not justify relief unless it 
is of such character that will completely undermine the entire structure of the case upon which the prosecution 
was based.”); see also In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766 (stating that so long as the evidence demonstrates 
“fundamental doubt on the accuracy” of earlier hearings, the conviction may be questioned). 
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.6 (West 2013). 
64. 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1240, (2008); SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 3.  When 
compared to the evidentiary standard for filing a motion for a new trial, the standard to petition for habeas 
corpus on the grounds of new evidence is much higher. PENAL § 1181. 
65. Schriever, supra note 40, at 779. 
66. Id. 
67. Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d at 723; 36 CAL. JUR. 3D, Habeas Corpus § 50 (2006). 
68. See Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d at 723 (“Proof that a red-headed man other than Lindley was in the 
vicinity of the boat house at the time the crime was committed, or the identification by a witness of this stranger 
as the ‘man in the willows’ would have weakened the prosecution’s case and presented a more difficult question 
for the trier of fact. But the testimony in regard to the other man does not point unerringly to Lindley’s 
innocence.”); Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State’s Restless Approach to Newly 
Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1437, 1453–56 (2007) (citing CAL. JUR. 3D, Habeas 
Corpus § 50 (2006)). 
69. 2013 STAT. Ch. 623 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900–04 (enacted 
by 2013 STAT. Ch. 800) 
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advances discovered after the original trial discredited the evidence used to 
convict the prisoner.
70
 Additionally, if the expert who corroborated the evidence 
at trial recanted his or her testimony, a prisoner is allowed a writ.
71
 Chapter 800 
augments Chapter 623; it simplifies the compensation process for exonerated 
individuals who seek remuneration from the time they were incarcerated.
72
  
D. Remedies for Habeas Corpus in California 
Exonorees, or persons who have been cleared of blame through habeas or 
other means, have a right to seek compensation for their wrongful incarceration.
73
 
If evidence shows a person was charged with a crime that was either not 
committed or not committed by that person, California Victim Compensation and 
Government Claims Board (CalVCP) must recommend an appropriation to the 
legislature.
74
 A claim is filed with CalVCP, which reviews the claim to determine 
if the exonoree qualifies for compensation.
75
 If CalVCP denies the claim, the 
exonoree may petition for an appeal, which, if granted, could lead to an 
administrative hearing before the Victim and Government Claims Board.
76
 The 
evidence relied on must meet the standard of pointing “unerringly to innocence,” 
and the board must recommend the appropriation without holding a hearing 
first.
77
 
III. SB 694 
SB 694 would have lowered the evidentiary standard required for petitioners 
to prevail on a “new evidence” writ of habeas corpus premised upon new 
evidence.
78
 SB 694 would have changed the evidentiary standard from “point 
unerringly to innocence” to a lower standard that evidence be “credible, material, 
presented without delay, and of such decisive force that it would have more 
likely than not changed the outcome at trial.”
79
 The evidence could not have been 
evidence that which could have been discovered before the original trial if the 
 
70. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 3 (May 4, 2015). 
71. Id. 
72. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900–04 (enacted by 2013 STAT. Ch. 800); SENATE APPROPRIATIONS 
COMMITTEE, supra note 70, at 3. 
73. See Appeals, CAL. VICTIM COMP. PROGRAM, http://vcgcb.ca.gov/law/appeals/ (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing how to seek compensation for 
wrongful incarceration). 
74. PENAL § 1485.55 (amended by 2015 STAT. Ch. 422). 
75. Appeals, supra note 73. 
76. Id. 
77. PENAL § 1485.55 (West 2013). 
78. SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not 
enacted). 
79.  Id. 
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attorney exercised due diligence, nor may the evidence have been “cumulative, 
corroborative, collateral, or impeaching.”
80
 
If the court that exonerated the inmate found the prisoner was factually 
innocent, the decision would have bound the CalVCP and the Board would have 
been required to recommend the legislature pay a claim and file an 
appropriation.
81
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section examines the impact SB 694 would have had on California’s 
prison population and the costs that would have been associated with 
implementing SB 694.
82
 This section will also explore what effect SB 694 would 
have had on the number on habeas claims filed by prisoners and whether it would 
have made petitions easier to file than it is under the present standard.
83
 Lastly, 
this section will look at how SB 694 would have impacted court judgments and 
how SB 694 could be improved in the future.
84
 
A. Envisioned Effect of SB 694 on California Prisons 
Between 1980 and 2010, the California state prison population increased by 
572 percent.
85
 In one year, the prison population in California increased by one 
percent and admitted 1,900 more prisoners than it released, averaging nearly 
4,000 newly admitted inmates.
86
 
Criminal justice experts criticize California’s state penal system operations, 
and California continuously remains one of the top three states for incarceration 
rates.
87
 Attempting to curb this statewide problem, the California Senate 
Committee for Public Safety considered legislation numerous times over the last 
decade to address prison overcrowding.
88
 
 
80.  Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See infra Part IV.A, C (discussing that impact to prisons would be minimal and that high costs, if any, 
would likely be seen during first years of implementation). 
83. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the procedural difficulties habeas petitioners handle and the rate 
petitions are filed under the current standard). 
84. See infra Part IV.D–E (addressing criticisms that SB 694 would eliminate certainty in judicial 
verdicts). 
85. SARAH LAWRENCE, CALIFORNIA IN CONTEXT: HOW DOES CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
COMPARE TO OTHER STATES? 1 (2012). 
86. E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BUREAU OF J. STATISTICS BULL., Sept. 30, 2014, at 4, 9. 
87. Id. at 3. California’s system was previously criticized by some for its perceived high conviction of 
innocent people, with speculation that California has one the three largest penal systems in the world. Medwed, 
supra note 68, at 1442–42. 
88. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 8. In 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed 
district court and Ninth Circuit decisions, ordering California to reduce its in-house adult prison population to 
137.5 percent of design capacity by February 2016. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1945 (2011) 
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Following Proposition 47 (Prop. 47) and realignment, California successfully 
reduced the population to 136.6 percent of prison capacity as of February 2015.
89
 
The state must now demonstrate that this solution is viable and sustainable over 
time in order to prevent overcrowding from reoccurring, as one of the ultimate 
goals for the Committee for Public Safety and the state legislature is to encourage 
legislation that maintains a reduced prison population.
90
 
 Codifying a less stringent standard for bringing a “new evidence” habeas 
petition may increase the number of successful petitions by a small amount as SB 
694 would have promulgated a preponderance standard rather than relying on the 
“point unerringly to innocence” standard.
91
 However, recent statistics show that a 
large number of habeas petitions are denied before a hearing is ever granted.
92
 
Nationally, there were 125 exonerations last year with only two exonerations 
specifically in California, so the average number of exonerations California could 
reasonably expect per year would be in the single digits.
93
  
The states that do use the preponderance standard for habeas petitions yield 
similar exoneration rates to California.
94
 In 2012, New York amended its post-
conviction statute to use the preponderance standard.
95
 In the last year, New York 
exonerated seventeen people—seven less than were exonerated in 2014.
96
 
Unfortunately, there is little data that identifies how far up the court system a 
case went before exoneration, which would offer more evidence on how directly 
habeas petitions contribute to these fluctuating rates of exoneration.
97
  
 Even if there was a connection between exoneration rates and habeas petitions, 
the most recent statistics available show that a majority of habeas petitions are 
shuffled through the system.
98
 In the 2014 fiscal year, the California Supreme 
Court received forty-one habeas petitions related to automatic appeals and denied 
 
(discussing that Bureau of Prisons recommendation of 130 percent bolstered the three-judge panel’s conclusion 
that a 130 percent population limit will alleviate pressure, but that upward adjustment to a higher percent 
population was warranted based on evidence from the State’s Corrections Independent Review Panel). 
89. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 2. 
90. See id. at 8 (inferring this from the numerous legislative attempts at reforming habeas corpus). 
91. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 2015 COURT STATISTICS REPORT STATEWIDE CASELOAD TREND 2003-
2004 THROUGH 2013-2014 10 (2015) (lowering the standard for evidence may require more evidentiary 
hearings which could reduce the number of habeas dispositions prior to evidentiary hearings); SB 694, 2015 
Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not enacted). 
92. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL, supra note 91, at 8 (demonstrating the large percentage of denied petitions 
compared to granted).  
93. Exonerations in 2014, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, Jan. 27, 2015, at 1. 
94. See STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 46 at 4–5 (listing the states that utilize the same 
form of habeas as California); see also Exonerations in 2014, supra note 93 (listing the exoneration rates for 
those states).  
95. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 440.10(g-1)(2) (McKinney 2015). 
96. Compare Exonerations in 2014, supra note 93 (listing 24 exonerated people), with Exonerations in 
2015, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, Feb. 3, 2016 at 5 (listing seventeen exonerated people). 
97. See generally Exonerations in 2015, supra note 96 (describing the trends in exoneration by crime or 
error, but not including reference to how many appeals various exonerations face previously).  
98. Id. 
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twenty-eight of those petitions.
99
 In total, the California Supreme Court received 
243 petitions for review and denied 233 petitions.
100
 In the trial courts, 7,410 
habeas corpus petitions were filed throughout the state and of those petitions, 
6,764 were dispositions that denied the petition before holding an evidentiary 
hearing.
101
 
These statistics indicate that less than one percent of petitions filed are 
granted, and less than ten percent of habeas petitions were granted hearings 
before the court reached a decision.
102
 Based on these numbers, the current 
standard does not release many prisoners on habeas, though other factors may 
contribute to this.
103
 If the Legislature passed SB 694, a lower evidentiary 
standard would have required more evidentiary hearings to determine the validity 
of the evidence and how much it weighed towards the petitioner’s innocence, 
which might have affected the number of dispositions on habeas petitions.
104
 
B. SB 694 and Increasing the Number of Petitions Filed 
Critics worried that SB 694 would result in more petitions, and the increase 
would overburden the courts, just as Prop. 47 did.
105
 Prop. 47 reduced non-serious 
and non-violent felony and property drug crimes from felonies to 
misdemeanors.
106
 It is estimated that Prop. 47 reduced the number of felony 
convictions in California by 40,000 per year and nearly one million prior felony 
convictions will be wiped from convicted persons’ records.
107
 Particularly in Los 
Angeles, one of the most populated areas in California, the court system saw a 
significant increase in applications.
108
 Local courts expected to process between 
4,000 and 14,000 applications from defendants who were arrested for felonies, 
 
99. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 91 at xiv. Capital convictions are cases that require automatic 
appeals. Id. 
100. Id. at 8. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. 
103. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining that habeas’ complexity and lack of counsel lead to often meritless 
petions). 
104. See Medwed, supra note 68, at 1458 (showing the California Penal Code and case law require an 
evidentiary hearing when there are factual disputes apparent in the pleading). 
105. 103 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 490.2, 666, 1170.18 (West 2014). 
106. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 59, at 8.; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 
490.2, 666, 1170.18 (West 2014). 
107. Robert K. Ross, Op-Ed: Four Ways to Make Black, Brown and All Lives Matter, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
15, 2015) http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0116-ross-california-reform-20150116-story.html (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
108. Abby Sewell & Cindy Chang, Proposition 47: County Report Details Profound Effect on Justice 
System, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015) http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-proposition-47-la-county-
report-20150225-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Nearly twenty-five percent 
of California’s population is in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
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but not yet convicted, who wanted to change their charges to misdemeanors.
109
 
Another 20,000 applications were expected from people who were convicted and 
currently serving time.
110
 Lastly, the courts expected to receive 300,000 cases 
from people who served their time and wanted their felony convictions changed 
to misdemeanors.
111
 
The state is still calculating the financial aftermath of Prop. 47.
112
 State courts 
anticipated a “one-time” increase in costs resulting from Prop. 47 due to 
processing resentencing and reclassification petitions, which require hearings.
113
 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office factored in safeguard from Prop. 47 that would 
reduce the additional burden, such as eliminating hearings for reclassification 
petitions.
114
 Long-term, the costs to courts will diminish because misdemeanors 
cost less to try in court than felonies, lowering the cost to try cases per 
offender.
115
 As a result, the Governor’s budget recommended an increase in the 
court budgets for the next two years to handle the upfront short-term costs, but 
because the data relied on was out-of-date, it is unclear whether the courts will 
need the additional money budgeted for later years.
116
 
SB 694 critics feared a similar mechanism would play out with habeas 
petitions.
117
 First, the standard would lead to more prisoners filing writs of habeas 
corpus in both trial and appellate courts because petitions that would have been 
previously denied for insufficient evidence would potentially be entitled to, at 
minimum, a hearing.
118
 Alternatively, the evidence could meet the lower standard, 
which would grant the prisoner the petition on the merits of his case.
119
 This 
concern relates to the impact of Prop. 47 because Prop. 47 lowered the threshold 
for several different crimes, just as SB 694 seeks to lower a standard.
120
 However, 
courts process far more felony and misdemeanor cases—it is the crux of criminal 
trial courts—than habeas petitions.
121
 While more evidentiary hearings would be 
 
109. Sewell & Chang, supra note 108. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See Mac Taylor, The 2015-2016 Budget: Implementation of Proposition 47, LEG. ANALYST’S 
OFFICE 16 (2015) (explaining that the fiscal impact is difficult to determine with certainty because of out-of-
date data).  
113. Id. at 14. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. at 14–15. 
116. Id. at 15. 
117. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 59 at 8. 
118. Id. 
119. See id. (qualifying for a petition would increase more hearings to determine the merits).  
120. Compare SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but 
not enacted) (lowering evidentiary standard for habeas), with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459.5, 473, 490.2, 666, 
1170.18 (West 2014) (reducing certainly felony crimes to misdemeanor levels). 
121. See JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 91 at preface (comparing over four million criminal trial 
hearings in superior court with over 400 habeas petitions heard).  
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required, it would not be at nearly the same rate as if every reclassification 
petition required one 
122
  
Another contrast is the cost of total litigation.
123
 Prop. 47’s effects in the long-
term are ideal because courts will save on future litigation costs, but habeas 
petitions are a prisoner’s last resort.
124
 Before filing the habeas petition, the 
prisoner utilized all other court resources to file every appeal possible, which cost 
the state money.
125
 However, if the habeas petition is the last option than the 
money spent on reviewing one prisoner’s habeas petition could be a small 
fraction of the total cost.
126
 To some critics, SB 694 posed a serious threat of 
increasing costs and it is likely that economic concern is what stalled the bill in 
the Appropriations Committee.
127
 
1. Could More Prisoners File Habeas Claims? 
Critics suggested that the lower evidentiary standard could have increased 
the number of frivolous claims, where the prisoner lacks any basis for relief 
under habeas, but files the claim anyway.
128
 The concern was that under the lower 
standard, prisoners would file more claims because more cases would be eligible 
for relief.
129
 An increase in claims was unlikely even before Senator Leno 
presented SB 694; prisoners filed habeas claims in droves in both state and 
federal courts in spite of the high “point unerringly to innocence” standard.
130
 The 
California courts also have a number of procedural mechanisms that prevent 
filing repetitive or additional claims, which would weed out any attempts by 
prisoners to overload the system with multiple frivolous claims.
131
 
Since prisoners are not deterred from filing frivolous claims under the current 
“point unerringly to innocence” standard, prisoners would only have continued to 
file petitions under the standard in SB 694.
132
 Lowering the standard would not 
 
122. Cf. id. (considering that the total number habeas petitions is far less than total trials, even assuming 
only a quarter are misdemeanors, the qualifying habeas petitions would be a drop in the bucket).  
123. Taylor, supra note 112, at 15. 
124.  Id.; In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 803 (J. Kennard dissenting) (describing habeas corpus as a 
traditionally “flexible procedural remedy of last resort to prevent severe and manifest injustice”). 
125. Capital Habeas Representation Budget Phases, U.S. DIST. CT., N. DIST. OF CAL., 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/budgetingforms (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) 
126. Cf. Taylor, supra note 112, at 15 (suggesting the bulk of costs to more hearings would be upfront). 
127. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 20. 
128. See Schriever, supra note 40, at 791 (addressing whether courts could handle the influx of new 
claims if the standard is lowered). 
129. Id. at 767. 
130. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 307 (2011) (“Because a habeas petitioner may skip over the lower 
courts and file directly in the California Supreme Court, that court rules on a staggering number of habeas 
petitions each year.”). 
131. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining how frivolous claims are filed even under the higher standard). 
132. Schriever, supra note 40, at 791. 
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have eliminated frivolous habeas claims because petitions are based on the 
quality of evidence produced and judges are able to identify when a claim is 
insufficient.
133
 By focusing on the quality of the evidence, courts would be able to 
catch the frivolous claims and deny them, just as they do under the current 
framework.
134
 Only claims that have a genuine dispute as to whether the evidence 
would make a conviction change more or less likely would require evidentiary 
hearings or reviews.
135
 A large number of habeas petitions fail automatically on 
procedural or timeliness issues, so while it is possible courts may need to utilize 
resources reviewing unmeritorious petitions, a large portion of frivolous petitions 
will be eliminated early on.
136
 
Despite critics’ concerns about the possible influx of habeas petitions, the 
purpose of SB 694 was to increase the number of petitions.
137
 SB 694’s purpose 
aligned with Senator Leno’s previous support for changes to habeas, such as 
Chapter 623.
138
 Following Bill Richards’ failed petition based on incorrect 
scientific evidence, Senator Leno presented then SB 1058.
139
 In the wake of Prop. 
47 and California’s initiative to reduce prison populations, Senator Leno 
presented possible reforms to habeas to reduce the number of wrongly 
incarcerated people.
140
 Under the new standard, prisoners who could not 
successfully file claims or seek other remedies would have had a chance at filing 
a petition.
141
 Although courts already considered allowing habeas claims on new 
evidence based on case law, adding a clause specifically about using new 
evidence as grounds for proving innocence would have codified the judicially 
created standard into the penal code.
142
 
SB 694 would have made the standard of review consistent with the other 
alternatives for post-conviction relief, such as ineffective assistance of counsel.
143
 
 
133. Id. at 791–92. 
134. Id. at 791. 
135. See SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not 
enacted). The standard for new evidence would require that a jury be more likely than not to reach a different 
outcome, so evidence that does not raise this issue would not require any hearing or review by courts. Id. 
136. Schriever, supra note 40, at 773–75. 
137. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 20, at 2 (“The burden for proving 
one’s innocence in such cases based on newly available evidence is not currently defined by statute, but has 
evolved from appellate court opinions, and is practically impossible to achieve in California . . . Even when new 
evidence shows that their conviction would have never occurred in the first place, an individual is likely to 
remain wrongfully incarcerated under the status quo in California.”). 
138. 2013 STAT. Ch. 623 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473). 
139. Madanat, supra note 61. 
140. 2013 STAT. Ch. 623 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900–04 (enacted 
by 2013 STAT. Ch. 800). 
141. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 4 (stating that those who currently 
cannot meet the higher standard must “repackage” their claims into other post-conviction standards of relief that 
apply the lower standard). 
142. SENATE COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 3 (May 30, 2015). 
143. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 20, at 2. 
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Although concerns over increased filing stemmed from concerns about 
overburdening courts, the ultimate goal of the legislation, to grant wrongfully 
incarcerated people a chance at long-waited justice, should be balanced against 
the possibility of burden.
144
 Proponents of SB 694 sought to release inmates from 
prison who do not deserve to be incarcerated.
145
 
2. Would Petitions Have Been Easier to File? 
Habeas corpus is a complicated legal concept.
146
 Trained lawyers struggle 
with it, and since habeas falls outside of someone’s Gideon right to counsel, 
prisoners must figure it out themselves without any legal training.
147
 Opponents 
of SB 694 claimed a lower evidentiary standard would make petitions easier to 
file, which would increase the number of petitions courts would review.
148
 
However, the reason habeas petitions are so difficult is not because of evidentiary 
standards, but because of procedural roadblocks to filing and limited resources 
prisoners have to create their petitions.
149
 Even before the court could consider the 
strength of the evidence under SB 694’s preponderance standard, there would be 
legal and procedural requirements that would need to be met.
150
 
Once a prisoner files a habeas claim and it is denied, the general rule is that 
repeat petitions are not allowed.
151
 A petitioner may not appeal the lower court’s 
denial of the petition, but must re-file the petition in the court of appeals.
152
 
However, a court will refuse to hear the repetitious claim if a lower court rejected 
it, unless an additional claim exists that the petitioner did not include in the first 
petition.
153
 Even if there are additional claims, this does not guarantee that the 
court will approve the petition.
154
 
The court must determine that an additional claim, like newly discovered 
evidence, was not reasonably discoverable at the time the first petition was 
filed.
155
 If the new evidence could have been discovered had the petitioner’s 
 
144. See id. (describing the purpose of the bill as giving individuals who believe they were wrongfully a 
chance to prove their innocence and to get out jail). 
145. Id. 
146. Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 541, 595 (quoting Jackson v. State). 
147. Id. at 541. 
148. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 59, at 8. 
149. Schriever, supra note 40, at 772–74. 
150. Medwed, supra note 68, at 1456–60 (explaining the venue where prisoners may file their habeas 
petitions, the stringent requirements for what the petition must contain, and the subsequent hearings they must 
attend presuming the petition is not denied); Schriever, supra note 40, at 773–75 (discussing limitations on 
repetitious claims and successive petitions, timeliness requirements, and procedural defaults). 
151. Schriever, supra note 40, at 772. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 772–73. 
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attorney exercised due diligence, the habeas petition likely would be denied 
under a new evidence basis.
156
 However, the petitioner would not be completely 
out of options because then the petitioner could argue that he had ineffective 
assistance counsel.
157
 If the petitioner is able to demonstrate that he or she did not 
receive a fair trial because the attorney was ineffective, it is possible that the 
court may grant the petition, presuming the other procedural requirements were 
met.
158
 
A court can deny a petition if there is a substantial delay in filing.
159
 Courts 
are sometimes willing to allow petitions to be filed despite the delay, but only if 
the prisoner can prove reasonable grounds for the delay.
160
 The courts consider a 
petition timely filed when it is filed “as promptly as the circumstances allow,” 
and if there is any delay, courts look to “‘the time the petitioner or counsel knew, 
or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the 
claim.’”
161
 
Considering court’s interest in proceeding efficiency and preserving finality 
of judgment, it is very hard for petitioners to persuade courts that their delay is 
reasonable.
162
 However, SB 694 added text to the “new evidence” clause that 
specifically stated the evidence must be presented “without substantial delay.”
163
 
The time required to discover the evidence is separate from the issue of the 
timeliness to file the petition so petitioners who would have filed following SB 
694 could have still been denied on timeliness grounds unless there was a good 
reason.
164
 
Nearly ninety-five percent of habeas petitions are filed pro se, meaning the 
prisoners complete the paperwork and navigate the legal system without the aid 
of an attorney.
165
 A petitioner’s initial burden when filing the petition is very high 
and the prima facie case must overcome the presumption that exists in favor of 
 
156. See id. (If a court were to determine that newly discovered evidence could have reasonably been 
discovered for the first trial, it is possible that a habeas petition could still be denied even if it satisfied the SB 
694 standard). 
157. STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 46, at 256–57. 
158. See Schriever, supra note 40, at 772 (describing the procedural requirements for bringing a habeas 
petition). 
159. Id. at 773. 
160. Id.  
161. Id. (quoting Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2011).). 
162. Id.  
163. SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not 
enacted). 
164. See id. (showing SB 694 did not affect any procedural posture of filing a habeas petition, solely the 
standard of the details evidentiary assessment). 
165. Frank Tankard, Tough Ain’t Enough: Why District Courts Ignore Tough-on-Paper Standards for a 
Federal Prisoner’s Right to a Hearing and How Specialty Courts Would Fix the Problem, 79 UMKC L. REV. 
775, 782–83 (2011). However, when death-row inmates file a habeas petition, the court is obligated to appoint 
them an attorney, but in non-capital cases the discretion to appoint an attorney rests with the court. Id. 
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the judgment.
166
 Since the standard is focused on the quality of evidence, unless 
the evidence adequately demonstrates that likelihood existed for a jury to return a 
“not guilty” verdict, the court will not approve the petition.
167
 
Although the evidentiary standard will affect the odds of a court reviewing a 
prisoner’s petition, it will not make the petition easier for a prisoner to 
complete.
168
 The Supreme Court ruled on a number of cases designed to improve 
access to legal resources for prisoners to help them successfully file their habeas 
claims, but this fails to take into account the education and mental competency 
necessary to file a pro se petition.
169
 Most prisoners do not enter prison with the 
necessary knowledge about the legal system and how it operates, making it 
difficult to understand the procedures they need to complete to file claims.
170
 
Particularly with habeas corpus—a notoriously difficult legal remedy— 
prisoners may have trouble figuring out the requirements and procedure if they 
do not have sufficient or up-to-date practice guides, access to legal databases or 
relevant secondary sources.
171
 Federal law limits assistance from law clerks to 
prisoners in preparing a habeas petition so most prisoners are presumably not 
preparing their petitions with the legal evidentiary standard in mind.
172
 A 
prisoner’s lack of legal knowledge and limited educational background often 
leads to “hard-to-decipher” petitions, making it difficult to accurately determine 
the merits of a prisoner’s habeas petition.
173
 Staff attorneys and court clerks 
initially read habeas petitions and determine the merits of the petition before 
recommending it to a magistrate or judge.
174
 Petitions filed pro se are generally 
lacking in meritorious claims, the staff do not have sufficient resources to 
investigate each claim independently to determine the actual merits of the 
petition.
175
  
 
166. Schriever, supra note 40, at 770. 
167. See SB 694 (changing the standard to “raises the possibility of a different outcome if a new trial 
were granted” with the newly discovered evidence presented). 
168. Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 299, 307 (2006). 
169. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481 (1963) (holding that states cannot adopt regulations that cut 
off defendants from appealing convictions because they are indigent); see also Burns v. Ohio. 360 U.S. 252, 
257–58 (1959) (waiving docket fees for indigent prisoners who file appeals and habeas petitions); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 (1956) (waiving fees for accessing prior trial records if the prisoner who needs 
them cannot afford it); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (overruling a regulation that required a legal 
investigator to overlook prisoners’ petitions before they could be filed in the courts); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817, 828 (1977) (holding that prisons are required to provide prisoners with sufficient resources in the law 
library and access to people trained in filing legal documents and withholding this access is unconstitutional). 
170. See O’Bryant, supra note 168, at 309. 
171. Id. at 309–10 (discussing the low level of legal knowledge and education of the average prisoner). 
172. Id. at 309. 
173. Schriever, supra note 40, at 795; Joseph L. Hoffmann 24(4) FED. SENT’G REP. 300, 302 (2012) 
(discussing the procedure of reviewing federal habeas corpus petitions). 
174. Cf. Hoffmann, supra note 173, at 302 (discussing the procedure of reviewing federal habeas corpus 
petitions). 
175. Cf. id. 
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Beyond limited access to useful legal sources in prison, inmates are not free 
to work on their petitions whenever is convenient for them.
176
 Prison runs on a 
schedule and every activity, from eating to sleeping, is scheduled.
177
 So the 
limited time someone has to work on his or her petition is restricted, including 
opportunities with speak with individuals who may be able to assist in writing the 
petition.
178
 This limitation is compounded when considering the procedural 
requirements which means the prisoner is working against the clock to file.
179
 
Even if SB 694 lowered the evidentiary standard, filing a habeas petition remains 
very difficult for the average prisoner seeking exoneration.
180
 
C. Would SB 694 Increase the State’s Costs? 
In addition to its effect on the prison population, there were possible financial 
effects of SB 694.
181
 The legislation would have resulted in the prison system, the 
judiciary, and the state’s general fund accruing costs associated with releasing 
prisoners who are wrongfully convicted, courts reviewing the petition itself, and 
granting an evidentiary hearing if the petition is granted.
182
 
1. Paying for Lost Time 
When exonorees seek compensation for their wrongful incarceration, the 
general fund pays appropriations for compensation claims from exonorees, 
ranging from hundreds of thousands of dollars, to the low millions of dollars in 
any given year.
183
 Michael Hanline, presently the victim of the longest case of 
wrongful incarceration in California history, collected $1.8 million dollars and is 
still collecting.
184
 In addition to increasing the possibility of more successful 
habeas claims, which would provide prisoners the opportunity for exoneration, 
the general fund would have received claims from convicted individuals whose 
judgments could have been vacated under the new standard.
185
 An accurate 
 
176. O’Bryant, supra note 168, at 329. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 330–31. 
179. Id.  
180. Id. at 307 (noting the specific difficulties prisoners often face when filing a habeas corpus petition); 
Schriever, supra note 40, at 773. 
181. See infra Part IV.C.1 (explaining the state’s process for paying exonerated individuals compared to 
imprisonment). 
182. See infra Part IV.C.2 (noting the court’s costs in hearing these petitions). 
183. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 694, at 3 (May 30, 2015). 
184. Michael Hanline, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-
stories/michael-hanline/ (last visited Aug. 20. 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
185. SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 70, at 1. 
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estimate of costs is difficult to calculate because it depends on the number of 
claims filed and the duration of the exonorees’ unlawful imprisonments.
186
 
As of May 4, 2015, three claims for compensation were pending in the 
legislature, totaling $1 million, which would bring the total payment value in the 
last thirteen years to $6.3 million.
187
 There is the possibility that short term costs 
will increase if more prisoners are released on the basis of the writ of habeas 
corpus; as restitution per person could cost more than the average of $47,421 the 
state spends per year per inmate.
188
 However, over the long term, avoiding future 
incarceration costs for wrongfully convicted inmates may far outbalance 
restitution settlements.
189
  
Senator Leno argued that SB 694 would have saved the state money because 
the cost of housing prisoners adds up quickly and the compensations are 
generally one-time payments to the exonorees.
190
 Using the average cost, housing 
an inmate for the rest of his or her life could cost up to $1,185,525, not 
considering increases due to inflation, which raises costs an average of $9,000 a 
year.
191
 
This amount is similar to the award Michael Hanline received, but is not 
indicative of the expected cost for all future exonorees, considering the gravity of 
Hanline’s wrongful incarceration.
192
 The cost would have peaked immediately 
after passing if petitions were granted to prisoners incarcerated for several 
decades, but eventually those imprisoned for shorter time could have petitions 
granted, reducing the payment costs.
193
 Proponents of SB 694 did not anticipate a 
large influx of exonerations from the lowered evidentiary standard, but at most, a 
few new exonerations would occur each year.
194
 Therefore, proponents do not 
anticipate a significant financial burden to the general fund, especially when 
compared to the impact of the thousands people who enter prison each year.
195
 
 
186. See id. (explaining that payment expected in any given year payment can range from hundreds of 
thousands to low millions of dollars). 
187. Id. Since 2002, the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board paid fourteen claims, 
totaling $5.3 million. Id. 
188. LAWRENCE, supra note 85, at 8. This estimate does not take into consideration additional healthcare 
costs for aging prisoners. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 183, at 4. 
191. David Breston, Cost of Prisons in the United States, VERA INST. OF JUST., 
http://www.davidbreston.com/prisonmap/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). If you multiply the average cost of an inmate by about twenty-five years, this can approximate the 
cost of housing a prisoner during his or her wrongful incarceration. Id. 
192. Hanline, supra note 184. 
193. Cf. Taylor, supra note 112, at 15 (suggesting the potential decrease of petitions, reducing the overall 
cost to the state under Prop. 47). 
194. Telephone Interview with Alex Simpson, Assoc. Dir., Cal. Innocence Project (July 27, 2015) (notes 
on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
195. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS; supra note 70, at 1 (May 4, 2015). Compare the 
cost of $5.3 million spent in compensations over the past thirteen years for fourteen claims with the cost of one 
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2. Cost to the Courts 
Although the number of filed claims would not necessarily have increased 
under the new standard, the courts would have likely incurred costs due to the 
time expended on reviewing more individual cases.
196
 Courts already suffered 
almost $1 billion in budget cuts in 2008.
197
 Although in 2014 Governor Jerry 
Brown proposed adding $105 million dollars to the judiciary budget to 
compensate for the influx of petitions from Prop. 47, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-
Sakauye felt this amount was still insufficient.
198
 
In some cases, courts pay the costs of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, 
such as in capital cases, using funds from tax revenues.
199
 Since the “unerringly to 
innocence” standard is so high, it is fairly easy for courts to determine whether or 
not it would be met, allowing them to issue judgments summarily.
200
 California 
summarily denied approximately ninety-seven percent of habeas petitions.
201
 
Under SB 694, courts would have needed to spend more time reviewing records 
in order to determine whether it is “more likely than not” that the evidence could 
have resulted in a different outcome, and this would lead to more evidentiary 
hearings.
202
 Since a petitioner is entitled to file a petition through all levels of 
state court, this could increase the possibility that a frivolous claim may require 
review from all levels, furthering waste of court resources.
203
 However, the 
procedural mechanisms currently in place could limit this effect.
204
 
 
year of housing prisoners multiplied by average number of incoming prisoners (4,000), which totals 
approximately $188,000,000. LAWRENCE, supra note 85, at 7. 
196. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 776 (1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting). “I know of only one sure way to 
discover abuse without defeating justice: to examine each petition on its own facts.” Id. at 802–03. 
197. Don Clyde, State’s Chief Justice Fights to Restore Funding for Courts, KQED, (Apr. 30, 2014) 
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/chief-justice-tani-cantil-sakauye-fights-for-increased-court-funding (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
198. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye: “In order to maintain the status quo—lines out the door, 
the delay, the closures—we need $266 million simply to maintain the status quo, which in my mind is 
substandard.”). 
199. Capital Habeas, supra note 125. There are four budget phases for capital hearings. Id. The first is for 
records review and preliminary investigation. Id. The second is for petition preparation, answer, and exhaustion. 
Id. The third is for the motion for evidentiary hearing and briefing of claims, and discovery. Id. The last is for 
the evidentiary hearing and final briefing. Id. Costs are associated based on the time of the attorney and any 
associates involved in researching and putting together the petition plus any experts required to testify. Id. The 
amount is calculated on an hourly rate. Id.; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 59, at 8 
(quoting the Judicial Council of California). 
200. Matthew Seligman, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s Application to 
Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469, 471 (2012). 
201. Id. “Summary dispositions” are decisions issued without a written opinion. Id. 
202. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 776 (1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting). “I know of only one sure way to 
discover abuse without defeating justice: to examine each petition on its own facts.” Id. at 802–03. 
203. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the number of frivolous claims filed and existing means of 
preventing overburdened courts). 
204. Id. 
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D. SB 694’s Impact on Finality of Judgment and Guilty Verdicts 
It is indisputable today that wrongful convictions occur—and they occur 
more often than exonerations.
205
 The purpose of SB 694 was to address this 
reality and provide the criminal justice system an opportunity to correct these 
wrongful convictions.
206
 According to opponents of SB 694, this would have 
affected the finality of judgment because by applying a lower standard to trials 
that were considered “fair,” SB 694 would have challenged and redefined the 
finality of a guilty verdict.
207
 It gives prisoners an opportunity to switch the 
verdict if the court grants their petition.
208
 The state certainly has an interest in 
preserving finality of judgment in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
legal system because regularly overturning convictions could raise concerns 
about the accuracy of trial.
209
 
The competing interests of the state to ensure valid judgments are weighed 
against the interest of ensuring people are not wrongly imprisoned.
210
 Some argue 
that the standard under SB 694 would no longer have been about whether a 
defendant is innocent or not, because the standard merely considers whether it is 
possible for a jury to reach a different verdict.
211
 This does not speak toward an 
individual’s guilt or innocence, so an allegedly guilty defendant could still meet 
this standard.
212
 However, the standard only allows a person’s petition to be 
considered, and subsequent hearings and trials would be necessary to determine 
whether an individual is actually innocent or guilty.
213
 
While it is possible that a guilty person could be acquitted under the standard 
set forth in SB 694, its purpose is to address and remedy the convictions of 
innocent people who were mistakenly convicted.
214
 However, if someone 
successfully jumps all the hurdles presented in filing a petition and meeting the 
evidentiary standard, it indicates that there is significant cause for calling his or 
her guilt into question.
215
 Although the petitioner already had his or her day in 
court when convicted, the significance of SB 694 was that it explicitly addressed 
 
205. Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know 
So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 927, 940 (2008). 
206. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 4. 
207. Id. at 5.  
208. Id. at 6. 
209. Schriever, supra note 40, at 790. 
210. Id. 
211. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 47, at 6. 
212. Id.  
213. Medwed, supra note 68, at 1452–60. 
214. Schriever, supra note 40, at 790. 
215. Id. 
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cases where the guilty verdict of the petitioner is questioned because particular 
evidence was not available on that day in court.
216
 
Just as Chapter 623 codified the standard for prisoners to file habeas petitions 
when new, unavailable technology presented exculpatory evidence, SB 694 
attempted to codify the same standard for prisoners whose evidence was not 
available at their original trial and could not be reasonably tracked down.
217
 SB 
694 would have offered a tool to check the legal system’s efficiency and 
accuracy at the same standard as other tools for post-conviction relief.
218
 
E. Alternative Considerations in the Wake of SB 694 Failure 
Adjusting the evidentiary standard for new evidence to meet other habeas 
claims is the first step in improving odds of reversal for wrongfully convicted 
prisoners.
219
 To meet SB 694’s goals, there are steps future legislation could 
take.
220
 
First, California could consider creating a publicly funded state agency 
similar to North Carolina’s Innocence Inquiry Commission.
221
 The Innocence 
Inquiry Commission investigates claims of wrongful conviction independent of 
state courts.
222
 When it reviews meritorious claims, the commission refers the 
claims to a special three-judge panel that solely conducts evidentiary hearings.
223
 
In cases where the meritorious claims sufficiently meet the burden, the panel has 
the authority to order the reversal of the conviction and the prisoner’s release.
224
 
This could be a middle ground for proponents and opponents of SB 694 because 
it provides an agency whose sole purpose is to review habeas petitions for 
meritorious claims and avoids overburdening the courts.
225
 Pro se prisoners would 
 
216. SB 694, 2015 Leg., 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as amended on Aug. 17, 2015, but not 
enacted). 
217. Id. 
218. See id. (codifying a standard to allow those wrongfully convicted the opportunity to present new 
evidence gives the opportunity to re-establish innocence). 
219. See Medwed, supra note 68, at 1465–75 (illustrating that timing restrictions, rigid legal standards, 
appellate review, and forum limitations are all flawed areas with how California currently handles new evidence 
claims). 
220. Schriever, supra note 40, at 796–98 (suggesting ways to create a record in the courts by requiring 
standardized forms for summary denials to give some indication about why the petition was insufficient); see 
generally, Hoffmann, supra note 173, at 303; Medwed, supra note 68, at 1475–80 (suggesting that California 
create a single procedure for reviewing claims based on newly discovered evidence to eliminate administrative 
burden on state courts). 
221. Hoffmann, supra note 173, at 303. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. See O’Bryant, supra note 168, at 307 (explaining the limited resources prisoners have when filing 
habeas petitions). 
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also benefit from having a state employee paid to develop the prisoner’s case 
rather than trying to the entire process alone.
226
  
Second, California could provide more resources to California prisoners who 
may be filing their habeas claims pro se.
227
 Similar to labor law requirements 
mandating that businesses post information regarding employee rights, prisons 
could similarly be required to post information on prisoner’s rights and the legal 
process for exercising those rights.
228
 Prisons could apply for non-profit grants to 
fund informational sessions from attorneys on how to file a habeas petition or 
how to fill one out.
229
 Often, prisons have older edition books, so their 
information is out of date.
230
 The legislature could impose some kind of 
requirement that if it is not feasible for books to be updated every time a new 
edition is released, then similar to the potential posted information on prisoner’s 
rights, there could be posters on updates to the law explaining the law and the 
implications on the prisoner’s rights.
231
 
V. CONCLUSION 
But for California’s initial efforts to improve habeas corpus standards, 
prisoners like Bill Richards would have no opportunity for release.
232
 Judicial 
opinion determined that newly discovered evidence that contradicted critical 
expert testimony was insufficient to “point unerringly to innocence,” but the 
 
226. See generally Garcia Uhrig, supra note 146 (arguing for a constitutionally mandated right to counsel 
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requires all employers to hang up various posters describing employee rights, similar posters could hang in 
prisons explaining protocol and remedies for prisoners who believe they are wrongfully convicted). 
229. See cf. Hoffmann, supra, note 173, at 302 (explaining that there is no guaranteed right to counsel for 
federal habeas petitions and there is no realistic chance of the Supreme Court or state legislation recognizing 
such a right because the only statutory right exists for prisoners convicted in capital cases). 
230. See generally Joseph A. Schouten, Not So Meaningful Anymore: Why a Law Library is Required to 
Make a Prisoner’s Access to the Courts Meaningful, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1211–12 (2004) 
(discussing a state’s constitutional obligation to provide prisoners with adequate libraries in order to research 
legal sources used to file appeals). 
231. See cf. Hoffmann, supra note 173, at 302 (describing that many petitions are “hard to decipher” 
because prisoners have no access to counsel so it would be beneficial for the State to provide a reasonable 
means of learning the law and receiving updates when the changes in a way that affects how their petition must 
be filed). 
232. In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 968 (2012); see Madanat, supra note 61 (explaining that a 2013 
court decision, Richards, inspired SB 1058, which eventually became law).  
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evidentiary value under a preponderance standard could have been much 
greater.
233
 
New evidence is frequently brought up in California state habeas petitions.
234
 
Historically, courts have hesitated to consider new evidence, regarding it with 
distrust and disfavor.
235
 This stems from consideration of what is supposed to 
occur during trial: both sides, the prosecution and defense, are zealously 
advocating their positions in order to secure their ultimate goal—a conviction or 
an acquittal, respectively.
236
 In conducting a complete trial, no stone should be 
left unturned, and the lawyers should uncover any and all evidence to support 
their positions.
237
 Because new evidence was rare at the time the “point unerringly 
to innocence” standard was enacted, any evidence brought forward indicative of 
a prisoner’s innocence needed to be very strong in order to change the status quo 
of a guilty conviction.
238
 
Senator Leno presented SB 694 as his latest attempt to help those wrongfully 
convicted reclaim their lives and move forward without the stain of prior 
convictions on their records.
239
 SB 694 garnered significant support from legal 
and civil liberty organizations.
240
 Considering the procedural and systematic 
mechanisms that limit filing of habeas petitions, lowering the evidentiary 
standard could not only allow California to adequately provide justice to those 
wrongfully convicted, but also align California with the majority of states who 
already apply this standard.
241
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